Implementing WASH Programmes in a Payment by Results Context

Please download to get full document.

View again

of 8
All materials on our website are shared by users. If you have any questions about copyright issues, please report us to resolve them. We are always happy to assist you.
Information Report
Category:

Documents

Published:

Views: 4 | Pages: 8

Extension: PDF | Download: 0

Share
Related documents
Description
The UK government’s Department for International Development (DFID) wants Payment by Results (PbR) to be a major part of the way it works in future, and other donors look set to follow suit. What does this mean for the WASH sector, and particularly for NGOs and their partners seeking to implement WASH programmes at scale? In 2014, DFID launched a WASH Results Programme which aims to reach 4.5 million people by December 2015, supporting achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The programme is financed on a PbR basis: the three delivering consortia receive payments only upon third-party verification that they have achieved a set of agreed results. Based largely on an internal review of the SWIFT Consortium’s experience of delivering the WASH Results Programme, this learning brief identifies a number of key issues to consider in incorporating the requirements of a PbR contract into the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of a WASH programme.
Transcript
  The SWIFT Consortium The SWIFT Consortium aims to deliver sustainable access to safe water and sanitation and encourage the adoption of basic hygiene practices in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kenya. Led by Oxfam, the consortium includes Tearfund and ODI as Global Members, and Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor (WSUP) as Global Associate, along with many implementing partners in the two focus countries.The SWIFT programme’s objective is to provide water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services (at least two of the three) to nearly 850,000 people by December 2015, and build capacity until March 2018 to ensure interventions are sustainable, helping to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development programmes. The SWIFT Consortium is funded with UK aid from the British people under a ‘Payment by Results’ contract. Instead of a grant, payment is tied to outputs and outcomes: non-delivery will result in The UK Government’s Department for International Development (DFID) wants Payment by Results (PbR) to be a major part of the way it works in future, and other donors look set to follow suit. What does this mean for the WASH sector, and particularly for NGOs and their partners seeking to implement WASH programmes at scale?  In 2014, DFID launched a WASH Results Programme which aims to reach 4.5 million people by December 2015, supporting achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The programme is nanced on a PbR basis: the three delivering consortia receive payments only upon third-party verication that they have achieved a set of agreed results. Based largely on an internal review of the SWIFT Consortium’s experience of delivering the WASH Results Programme (see box on page 2), this learning brief identies a number of key issues to consider in incorporating the requirements of a PbR contract into the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of a WASH programme.   Implementing WASH programmes in a Payment by Results context Emma Feeny (SWIFT Consortium)    P   h   o   t   o  :   T   h   e   O  x   f   a   m    t   e   a   m ,   K   e   n  y   a SWIFT Consortium learning brief   Bidding to deliver a WASH programme under a PbR contract – a checklist PbR contracts are a recent development in the WASH sector, and there is not yet a great deal of learning on which to draw upon among implementing partners, donors or providers of monitoring, verication and evaluation services (MVE). Below are some of the issues that should be considered when putting together a tender. The need for a clear, detailed idea of what a PbR framework entails  It’s essential that all partners understand how the contract will work in practice, and how implementing it will differ from implementing a grant-funded programme. The need to price sufficiently for risk Under a PbR contract, nancial risk is transferred to the implementing agencies, who won’t get paid if they don’t deliver results to the required standard. Under DFID’s WASH Results Programme, they must also deliver within a set timeframe, and won’t receive full payment if services fail over the longer term. The risk of not delivering results may be particularly acute in fragile contexts. Careful thought will be needed around how to manage this, and how to ensure sufcient contingency funding is in place. Consideration will also be required as to how much risk to pass on to implementing partners; or, if none, how to ensure their motivation. The need to price sufficiently to meet monitoring and reporting requirements A PbR programme requires more robust budgeting for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) than programmes funded with conventional grants. Time and resources may be needed to build the capacity of staff and establish and test new systems, and M&E processes may require logistical support, staff training costs, back-ofce staff availability, IT functionality and new internal systems. Given the signicance of reporting under a PbR contract, a higher level of management oversight from head ofce is also likely to be required to ensure that evidence of sufcient quality is submitted. In addition, it will be more expensive to comply with monitoring and verication requirements in fragile contexts lacking in infrastructure. The need to base the bid on a realistic price per beneficiary Given the innovative nature of the contract, there may not be an evidence base to provide guidance on pricing, and the cost of reaching beneciaries will vary widely between contexts, outputs and implementing partners. Delivering sustainable services in fragile contexts will incur higher costs in terms of logistics, materials, management and human resources. Opportunities to shape the design of PbR programmes At this stage, funders seeking to apply PbR frameworks may be open to ideas about how to The SWIFT Consortium The SWIFT Consortium aims to deliver sustainable access to safe water and sanitation and encourage the adoption of basic hygiene practices in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kenya. Led by Oxfam, the consortium includes Tearfund and ODI as Global Members, and Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor (WSUP) as Global Associate, along with many implementing partners in the two focus countries.The SWIFT programme’s objective is to provide water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services (at least two of the three) to nearly 850,000 people by December 2015, and build capacity until March 2018 to ensure interventions are sustainable, helping to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development programmes. The SWIFT Consortium is funded with UK aid from the British people under a ‘Payment by Results’ contract. Instead of a grant, payment is tied to outputs and outcomes: non-delivery will result in non-payment, and non-sustainability will result in reduced payment. 2  structure contracts; for example, by mixing grant- funding for recurring costs or for activities, with PbR for the achievement of outcomes. This can reward innovation and enable partners to focus on working with communities and government, rather than being locked into a costly cycle of verication of activities and outputs. The need to agree payment milestones and triggers Ideally, payments will be based on clearly dened results, measured by unambiguous indicators that are straightforward to verify. However, contracts that are 100% PbR may require more complicated payment formulae in order to address cash-ow challenges; for example, with payments made for intermediate results. These ‘results’ may be time- consuming to evidence as well as difcult to verify, and it may be better to consider measures such as including some kind of mobilisation advance; agreeing payments for partial as well as total achievements of an indicator; or agreeing payments linked to the achievement of outputs such as baseline surveys or action plans. Outcome results may be particularly difcult to negotiate; what, for example, is an adequate outcome target for sustained hygiene behaviour change, and how can this be veried to everyone’s satisfaction? There is still a lack of evidence on the effectiveness of many WASH interventions in terms of sustained behaviour change, and it’s important that outcomes and how they will be measured are clearly dened at the outset so that all partners understand the goals they are working towards. The need to negotiate a degree of flexibility in the contract It may be helpful to have a mechanism to transfer targets between partners or countries, or to take a portfolio approach, with consolidated milestones/payment triggers, so that under-achievement in one area can be balanced by over-achievement in another. The need to strike the right balance between upward and downward accountability Given the innovative and often complex nature of PbR contracts, there is a risk that the focus on meeting the requirements of the external verier may eclipse accountability to beneciary communities and/or to local and national governments; it’s important to retain the ethos of an NGO. 3 PHOTO: THE TEARFUND TEAM, DRC  4 The design phase – targets, triggers, milestones and matrices Ideally, the design phase of a PbR programme will be an iterative process; plans are likely to be modied and adapted during the inception phase (see below) as monitoring and reporting requirements are agreed and all parties come to an understanding of what will be required to demonstrate results. Key issues to consider when designing a PbR programme include: Targeting communities and selecting activities  The need to achieve results in order to receive payment, particularly under a tight deadline, may lead some NGOs to avoid targeting the most remote or vulnerable communities, particularly in fragile contexts where the situation on the ground may be uid and unpredictable. It may also result in a weaker emphasis on ‘soft initiatives’ such as community engagement and institutional strengthening, which are difcult to measure and verify, and a bias towards those activities which can be more easily counted as payment triggers.To avoid this, programmes should be designed with a high degree of exibility and an adequate budget for the risk of under-performance; for example, if the need to focus on tricky but essential governance and relations work means some outputs targets are missed. In this way, it should be possible to ensure that the most vulnerable will in fact benet not only from the opportunities a PbR framework can provide to foster innovation, but from the opportunity PbR contracts offer all target communities to hold NGOs to account for the delivery of services and support. Payment matrices/schedule Under a PbR contract, the traditional NGO logframe setting out programme goal, outcome(s), outputs, activities and accompanying M&E framework  must be translated to a ‘payment matrix’, setting out the verication requirements for payment indicators and milestones. This needs to be done in such a way that all partners understand the relationship between the two and a ‘disconnect is avoided. There may be a requirement for additional indicators which don’t have a payment attached to them, but w hich need to be tracked to PHOTO: THE OXFAM TEAM, KENYA
Recommended
View more...
We Need Your Support
Thank you for visiting our website and your interest in our free products and services. We are nonprofit website to share and download documents. To the running of this website, we need your help to support us.

Thanks to everyone for your continued support.

No, Thanks