Systemic Vulnerabilities

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Excelente revisión de los móviles del desarrollo socioeconómico. Una comparación que arroja mucha luz. Máxime si bien se lee desde una perspectiva deductiva.
  Systemic Vulnerability and theOrigins of Developmental States:Northeast and Southeast Asia inComparative Perspective Richard F. Doner, Bryan K. Ritchie,and Dan Slater Abstract  Scholars of development have learned a great deal about what eco-nomic institutions do, but much less about the srcins of such arrangements. Thisarticle introduces and assesses a new political explanation for the srcins of devel-opmental states —organizational complexes in which expert and coherent bureau-cratic agencies collaborate with organized private sectors to spur national economictransformation. Conventional wisdom holds that developmental states in South Korea,Taiwan, and Singapore result from state autonomy, especially from popular pres- sures.  We argue that these states' impressive capacities actually emerged from thechallenges of delivering side payments to restive popular sectors under conditions ofextreme geopolitical insecurity and severe resource constraints. Such an interactivecondition of systemic vulnerability never confronted ruling elites in Indonesia,Malaysia, the Philippines, or Thailand—allowing them to uphold political coalitions,and hence to retain power, with much less ambitious state-building efforts.Scholars of economic development have become increasingly avid students of eco-nomic institutions. Studies abound on the norms, rules, and organizations that reg-ulate and, to varying degrees, coordinate a society's productive activities. Few wouldnow question Rodrik's conclusion that the quality of institutions is key for eco-nomic growth.'Yet our growing understanding of the economic impacts of these institutionshas not been matched by our understanding of their political srcins.^ In this arti- Authors listed alphabetically. We are grateful to the following for helpful comments: Cliff Carrubba,Eric Hershberg, Dave Kang, Stephan Haggard, Linda Lim, Greg Noble, Kristen Nordhaug, John Raven-hill, Eric Reinhardt, Dani Reiter, Tom Remington, Michael Ross, Randy Strahan, Judith Tendler, andtwo anonymous reviewers. Special thanks to David Waldner, whose book inspired this article and whograciously provided important insights.1. Rodrik  2003,  10. For general reviews of the vast literature on institutions and growth, see, forexample, Aron 2000. On institutions as organizations, see, for example. World Bank  2003;  and Halland Soskice 2001. 2.  Bates 1995. International Organization  59, Spring 2005, pp. 327-361© 2005 by The 10 Foundation. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818305050113  328 International Organization cle,  we aim to narrow this gap by providing a political account of the emergenceof a particular type of institutional arrangement: developmental states. We definedevelopmental states as organizational complexes in which expert and coherentbureaucratic agencies collaborate with organized private sectors to spur nationaleconomic transformation. As many scholars have argued, in the small number ofcountries where they emerged, these institutional features were key to an unparal-leled capacity for the promotion of economic development.^But why do these institutional arrangements emerge? In contrast to scholars whoportray developmental states as highly autonomous entities, unconstrained by coa-litional demands, we contend that developmental states will only emerge whenpolitical leaders confront extraordinarily constrained political environments. Spe-cifically, we argue that political elites will only build such institutional arrange-ments when simultaneously staring down the barrels of three different guns: (1)the credible threat that any deterioration in the living standards of popular sectorscould trigger unmanageable mass unrest; (2) the heightened need for foreignexchange and war materiel induced by national insecurity; and (3) the hard budgetconstraints imposed hy a scarcity of easy revenue sources. We call this interactivecondition systemic vulnerability. Developmental states are significant hut rare. In the newly industrializing coun-tries (NICs) of South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, these institutional appara-tuses have enhanced information fiows both within and between the public andprivate sector, giving bureaucrats the wherewithal to help firms compete with globalrivals in more challenging economic activities. Just as critically, these institu-tional arrangements have given bureaucrats the political clout to make crediblebut conditional commitments and thus to withdraw support from firms that under-perform in spite of state assistance. Solving information and commitment prob-lems has helped these states coordinate multiple actors and pursue long-termeconomic objectives. The result has been an impressive level of upgrading :shifts, based on growth in local innovation capacities, from lower-value to higher-value economic activities within global commodity chains. In other words, thesecountries combined export promotion with industrial deepening. This distin-guishes the NICs from the four high-growth members of the Association of South-east Asian Nations (henceforth ASEAN-4)—Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines,and Indonesia—where intermediate state institutions have been associated withimpressive growth and economic diversification, but little upgrading. 3.  Foundational studies include Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; and Haggard 1990. Sub-sequent work includes Noble 1998; Woo-Cumings 1991; Evans 1995; Kuo 1995; and McNamara 1999. 4.  In this article, the causal relationship between developmental states and economic performanceis presumed, not proven. For arguments that institutions are key for upgrading, see Evans 1995; Wade1990; Amsden 2001; and Waldner 1999. On the important distinction between upgrading and diversi-fication (or structural change), see Gereffi forthcoming; Waldner 1999; and Weiss 1998. For empiricalstudies of economic performance differences between the NICs and the ASEAN-4, see Amsden 2001;Wong and Ng 2001; Booth 1999; and Rasiah  2003.  Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia 329Analysts differ as to the ultimate benetits of the interventionist policies devel-opmental states have pursued. Yet even economists skeptical as to their benefitsagree that, because such policies have been institutionally demanding, the par-ticular institutions comprising developmental states were critical to whatever ben-efits resulted from them. Because developmental failure appears to representinstitutional failure, and not just policy failure, our aim in this article is to explainwhy these conditions ... [of institutional capacity] ... rarely obtain. ^ Institu-tional capacity is our dependent variable.Any explanation for the scarcity of developmental states must be a politicalone. Economic institutions ultimately arise from the rough-and-tumble of elite pol-itics, not from choices by private parties to enhance mutual welfare.^ But politi-cians are primarily motivated by concerns with securing their power. This typicallyleads them to de-emphasize the provision of broad collective goods and to fashioninstitutions as vehicles for channeling largesse to key constituencies—typicallyeconomic elites interested in easy profits through speculation and rent seeking—rather than serving any of the more virtuous economic functions noted above.'Political incentives typically lead neither to shared goals of national economictransformation, nor to the creation of monitoring devices and incentive structuresthrough which political leaders (principals) control the bureaucrats (agents) whoimplement such goals.^ We thus cannot explain developmental states as a result ofeither benign motivations or state autonomy. Rather, to avoid the thin politics that has characterized most work on developmental states, we must specify theconstraints that make it difficult for politicians to preserve power through clien-telist connections to the private sector alone, as well as the incentives that encour-age them to build new institutions for economic transformation.'In this article, we argue that the political srcins of developmental states can belocated in conditions of systemic vulnerability, or the simultaneous interplay ofthree separate constraints: (1) broad coalitional commitments, (2) scarce resourceendowments, and (3) severe security threats. Any subset of these constraints mightmake it somewhat more difficult for rulers to stay in power without improvinginstitutional performance. Even mild constraints might inspire politicians to foregotheir individual interest in maximizing patronage resources, and press them to con-vert the bureaucracy into more of an instrument, less of an arena. '° But there isa cavernous gap between the political will necessary to build such intermediate states and that which is required to construct a developmental state. Unless polit-ical leaders are confronted by all three of these constraints at the same time, we 5.  Pack 2000, 64. See also World Bank 1993, 6; atid Page 1994.6. See Bates 1995; and Knight 1992. 1.  Geddes 1994.8. Moe 1984.9. On thin politics, see Wade 1992; Moon and Prasad 1998; and Haggard 2004. 10.  Emmerson 1978, 105. 11.  See Evans 1995, 60, for the distinction between intermediate and developmental states.  330  International Organizationargue, they will find less challenging ways of staying in power (Figure 1). In sum,leaders such as South Korea's Park Chung Hee, Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, andTaiwan's Chiang Kai-Shek only took the lead in building developmental statesbecause they were more tightly bound, not more brilliant or benign, than theircounterparts throughout the developing world.Our argument thus suggests that the interactive condition of systemic vulnera-bility is both a necessary and sufficient condition for developmental states. Wemake this structuralist argument in deterministic rather than probabilistic termsnot to deny the agency of state leaders, but to facilitate falsification. If futureresearch uncovers instances when leadership failures (or other factors) forestalledthe emergence of developmental states, even though all three conditions were ineffect, the sufficient argument can be considered falsified. If examples of develop-mental states can be shown to have emerged in the absence of systemic vulnera- Narrow coalitions Broad coalitions Reduced pressure  Pressure for extensive for side payments  side payments / \Mild external  Severe extemal threat  threat 1 1 ide payments  Side payments need not compete  mnst not undermine with defense  defense spending Abundantresources 1 ide paymentsaffordable withoutupgrading 1 1 ondevelopmentalinstitutions Scarceresources 1 Side paymentsunaffbrdablewithout upgrading   DevelopmentalinstitutionsFIGURE  1.  Argument flow
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