The Weak Link: The role of local institutions in accountable natural resource management in Peru, Senegal, Ghana, and Tanzania | Mining | Accountability

Please download to get full document.

View again

of 74
All materials on our website are shared by users. If you have any questions about copyright issues, please report us to resolve them. We are always happy to assist you.
Information Report
Category:

Documents

Published:

Views: 9 | Pages: 74

Extension: PDF | Download: 0

Share
Related documents
Description
Extractive industries present potentially large opportunities for developing countries. However, advocates for responsible natural resource management are often frustrated by the fact that best-practice policy prescriptions are frequently ignored by governments in developing counties. As a result, there has been a growing effort to understand how policy decisions are made, and how political and economic incentives shape development outcomes. With support from the Bill
Transcript
    THE WEAK LINK THE ROLE OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS IN ACCOUNTABLE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN PERU, SENEGAL, GHANA, AND TANZANIA OXFAM RESEARCH REPORT   Oxfam America | The Role of Local Institutions in Accountable Natural Resource Management in Peru, Senegal, Ghana, and Tanzania 2   COVER:  A woman leads her child to school beneath a mountain of toxic mineral waste in the community of Champamarca, near Cerro de Pasco, Peru. David Stubbs   / Oxfam America  The Role of Local Institutions in Accountable Natural Resource Management in Peru, Senegal, Ghana, and Tanzania | Oxfam America  1 CONTENTS Executive summary ............................................................................................... 2   1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 5 Motivating the research ..................................................................................... 7   Outline of the report ........................................................................................... 9   2. Country overview ............................................................................................ 11   3. Revenue sharing ............................................................................................. 16   Crisis, structural adjustment, stabilization, and the pursuit of foreign direct investment ............................................................................. 18   Efforts at reform ............................................................................................... 20   What drives extractive industry policy? ........................................................... 22   4. Allocating revenues: Regional sharing, sectoral earmarking, and the budget ................................................................................................ 26 Regional sharing .............................................................................................. 27   Budget allocations ........................................................................................... 30   5. Broken accountability systems ........................................................................ 35    A strong executive ........................................................................................... 35 Compromised oversight ................................................................................... 40   Limited transparency ....................................................................................... 43 6. Civil society and possibilities for reform .......................................................... 45   Does budget transparency matter for following the money? ........................... 45   How can efforts to follow the money be improved? ......................................... 48   Do efforts to follow the money work? .............................................................. 49   What to do when there is no transparency? .................................................... 51   Does the public care about the budget? .......................................................... 52 Is law or its implementation the main problem for accountability in public revenue management? .................................................................................... 53   What can we learn from past successes? ....................................................... 56 7. Conclusion: Power, control, and accountability ............................................... 62   References .......................................................................................................... 66    Oxfam America | The Role of Local Institutions in Accountable Natural Resource Management in Peru, Senegal, Ghana, and Tanzania 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report represents a synthesis of findings from four separate country studies, looking at the determinants of fiscal accountability and extractive industry revenues in Peru, Senegal, Ghana, and Tanzania. The work is informed by an imperative to ensure that extractive industry revenues are better used to achieve human development. To this end the work is focused on understanding (i) the determinants of revenue sharing agreements between companies and countries, (ii) the determinants of national budget allocations, and (iii) the causes of budget leakage. A central theme of the report is focused on understanding what the law is, how the law came to be, whether the law is followed, and what explains the difference between what is meant to happen and what actually happens.  Across the countries, terms of revenue sharing between countries and companies appear to be driven by large-scale structural features of the global economy (such as mineral prices, debt levels, and investor confidence). In addition, however, it appears that idiosyncratic features (such as the capricious decisions of individual political actors and the imperatives of special interest groups) also play a role. In this respect very high levels of executive autonomy, and weak oversight, are thought to create scope for corruption when signing revenue sharing agreements. Regarding revenue allocation, there are notable differences in the laws across the countries, with some having chosen to earmark revenues (either for specific sectorial investment, or to prioritize sending revenues back to the regions where resource extraction is taking place) and those which simply channel those revenues into the national budget. While earmarking makes public oversight of the revenues easier it is not clear from this research whether earmarking has generated more impressive development results, with accountability deficits persisting in cases where revenues are earmarked and where they are not. Regarding revenues that enter the central budget, their distribution is largely determined by the general budget dynamics which are, in turn, characterized by a dominant executive. Although it is not possible to compare the degree to which the executive dominates the budget across the countries, it is notable that such dominance was thought to characterize the budget process across all the countries irrespective of the different levels of budget transparency and formal allowances for participation.
Recommended
View more...
We Need Your Support
Thank you for visiting our website and your interest in our free products and services. We are nonprofit website to share and download documents. To the running of this website, we need your help to support us.

Thanks to everyone for your continued support.

No, Thanks